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Schenker's Theory, Schenkerian
Theory:
Pure Unity or Constructive Conflict?
Richard Cohn
In his contribution to the symposium on "The Future of Theory,"
published in Volume 10 of this journal (1989), Nicholas Cook, in the
context of a discussion of musical unity, writes the following, in part
as a reaction to an unpublished paper of mine:
I want to ...suggest that the assumption that Schenkerian
analysis is about unity does a disservice to Schenker.
Rather, I would maintain that it is predicated on the concept
of unity (for Schenker, "structure" is a technical term
meaning what in a piece of music can be modelled
hierarchically, and so abstracted from context), but about
tension, conflict, disunity. In a recent paper, Richard Cohn
teased out some of the internal contradictions of everyday
Schenkerian discourse, showing how Allen Cadwallader's
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Americanization of Heinrich Schenker.' '7
Cook's citation of Schenker's "tension of musical coherence"
provides a handy point of access. This phrase is excerpted from the
following sentence in Free Composition:
Das Erfassen der Zusammenhange in den Meisterwerken
iiberschreitet die geistige Kraft zumal der heutigen
Menschen, die ohne Zusammenhang in sich selbst die
Spannung eines Zusammenhanges iiberhaupt nicht mehr
vertragen. 8
The standard Oster translation condenses the sentence somewhat.
Here is William Pastille's translation:
Perceiving the coherence in the masterworks exceeds
the spiritual power of contemporary men especially, who,
without coherence in themselves, can no longer endure the
tension of any kind of coherence.9
What can Schenker mean by die Spannung eines
Zusammenhanges in this context? Spannung primarily denotes a
physical property: stretching, tightening, or, most specifically, the
spanning of an arch. Inherent in this physical meaning is linearity, the
connection of two points. Thus Spannung is closely related to Zug,
which "connotes primarily stretching, pulling, tensing, and
7William Rothstein, "The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker," In Theory Only
9/1 (1986): 5-17; reprinted in Hedi Siegel (ed.), Schenker Studies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 193-203.
8Heinrich Schenker, Der jreie Satz, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1956), 32.
Emphasis added.
9William A. Pastille, "Ursatz: The Musical Philosophy of Heinrich Schenker"
(ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1985), 35.
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spanning-the notion of connecting over distances. "10 Transferred
into the psychological domain, Spannung retains this linear quality:
anticipation, suspense, eager expectation. Some anonymous personified
entity is placed in the position of a positive, protagonizing force,
striving toward a desired goal, but obstructed by a negative,
antagonizing force which substitutes for gravity. At the same time,
Spannung acquires a meaning that is somewhat further displaced from
the metaphorical source: the tension between plural autonomous
entities, as in conflict, discord, or strained relations, e.g. the tension
between the Armenians and the Azerbajianis. Here, conflicting forces
are neither personified nor assigned value. The observer of such
conflicts may well be neutral with respect to them, and simply
appreciate the rich complexity of their interaction.
The passage in question does not easily resolve itself into a
determinate reading of Spannung, either on its own or in its local
context. But parallel passages from elsewhere in Schenker's late
writings provide important clues. The essay "Resumption of Urlinie
Considerations," from Book 2 ofDas Meisterwerk in der Musik, begins
as follows:
The mentally perceived unit of an auskomponierung
span constitutes a mentally perceived tension (bedeutet eine
geistige Spannung) between the beginning and end of the
auskomponierung span because the initiating tone of the
auskomponierung span must continue in our minds until
the final tone appears. This tension span (Diese Spannung)
alone creates musical coherence, Le.: the auskomponierung
span (Auskomponierungszug) is the only conveyor of
connection and synthesis. 11
10J.bid., 68.
llDas Meisterwerk in der Musik, Yearbook 2 (Vienna: Drei Masken Verlag, 1926),
11; trans. Sylvan Kalib, "Thirteen Essays from the Three Yearbooks 'Das Meisterwerk
in der Musik' by Heinrich Schenker: An Annotated Translation" (Ph.D. diss.,
Northwestern University, 1973), ii, 164. Italics are Schenker's.
Schenker, Free Composition, trans. Ernst Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), 4.
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fundamental linear progression provides it with breath. 15
7
In none of these passages is the conflict of Spannung between
robust autonomous forces healthily tugging the listener in contradictory
directions. The conflict is between, on the one hand, the salutary
discipline of linear coherence, of focusing on a (perhaps distant) goal,
and on the other hand, the decadent allure of the "eternally disordered
foreground" 16 which, like gravity, perpetually pulls the listener
downward, derails him from achieving true comprehension. Schenker
is encouraging musicians to stop being such couch potatoes and to learn
how to become musical Michael Jordans: to maintain the momentum of
trajectory, to traverse ever more distant spans without succumbing to
the temptations of the momentary, to "create a purely musical
coherence even, as it were, in flight." 17 The' 'tension of coherence,"
insofar as it resides in the listener or performer, is the energy necessary
to attain coherence. Once achieved, the tension inhabits the coherent
structure itself, as in an elastic cord or a violin string stretched taut and
secured at both terminals. Schenker's mature theory is not a
celebration of conflict and contradiction, but rather of overcoming
them.
Pastille's dissertation places this analysis in a broader perspective.
Pastille finds that Schenker's ontology, closely related to Goethe's
morphology, consists of two primary forces: centripetal, binding unity
and centrifugal, developmental growth. The interaction of these forces
creates "the energizing polarity in Schenker's system, "18 which is
manifested in the Zug, "an energized, but stable, structure that retains
the growth energy used to stretch apart the original simultaneity.' '19
The stability results from the unity of the background, which "pulls
15Ibid., 13.
16Free Composition, 3.
17Ibid., 7.
18pastille, "Ursatz," 71.
19Ibid., 67.
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the parts of the organism inward, holds them together, restrains them
from unchecked, erratic growth, and prevents them from tearing the
whole asunder.' '20 Thus, despite the pluralism implicit in this
dialectic, Schenker is ultimately a monist:
Just as the background's reality is opposed by the
foreground's appearance, so the unity of the background is
opposed by the diversity of the foreground. The wealth of
activity in the foreground, the multiplicity of different
motions, the variety of textures, the independent
motives-all resolve into a single, simple, unified reality in
the background. This is the kernel of Schenker's monistic
idealism.21
Cook is right, then, to assign a role to tension, conflict, and
disunity in Schenker's conceptual universe. I am less prepared to agree
with him, however, when he substitutes "contradiction" for
"conflict." Contradiction occurs only when unity fails to resolve the
multiplicity, when growth is unchecked, and the fabric is torn asunder.
When Cook writes that "for Schenker, 'structure' is a technical term
meaning what in a piece of music can be modelled hierarchically, and
so abstracted from context," he ignores copious and emphatic claims
by Schenker to the contrary. Over and over again, in both Meisterwerk
and Free Composition, Schenker emphasized the distinction between
tone-sequences that are derivable from the Ursatz via voice-leading
transformations, and those that are not. The following quote, from the
first volume of Meisterwerk, is typical:
By picking out a pair of distantly related tones from
the upper voice-by this alone, nothing has as yet been
proven; the tones must withstand the structural test (der
Satzprobe)! Only that which is capable of being proven by
20Jbid., 70.
21Ibid., 33.
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voice-leading transformations is valid. 22
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Restated: only that which can be modelled hierarchically, and so
abstracted from context, is valid. Cook implies that the penalty for
failing the Satzprobe is placement in a box marked' 'not structural, but
interesting anyway." But Schenker marked the boxes differently: to
pass the Satzprobe is to be real, genuine, true; to fail is to be illusory,
apparent, false, and even nonexistent. And the categories demarcated
by these terms are hardly valueless: Schenker exhorted the "rejection
of mere appearance. "23 He began the final sentence of the quote
translated above as follows: "Es gilt eben nur... ," implying that to fail
the Satzprobe is to be worthless. In Free Composition, Schenker
wrote: "The fundamental structure represents the totality. It is the
mark of unity and, since it is the only vantage point from which to
view that unity, prevents all false and distorted concepts (falsche,
schielenden Betrachtung). ,,24 To be false is to be distorted, or
perhaps, in a translation that catches the idiomatic pungency of
schielenden-to be cockeyed. Later, we are reminded that "a sequence
of tones cannot live in the foreground unless the total tension of the
fundamental linear progression provides it with breath; no life can be
breathed into it from the foreground. "25 Here, to fail the Satzprobe
is to be denied any ontological status whatsoever.
Further evidence of the monolithic status that Schenker assigned
to the Ursatz is found in his wild attempts to subsume all
compositional features to its complete control. In Meisterwerk 1 he
claimed that "it will be systematically shown for the first time that
dynamics, like voice leading and diminution, are organized according
22Kalib, ii, 140-41.
23Pau1 Mast, "Brahms's Study, Octaven u. Quinten u. A., with Schenker's
Commentary Translated," in Felix Salzer (ed.), Music Forum 5 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980), 151.
24Free Composition, 5.
25Ibid., 13.
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to structural levels, genealogically, as it were. For each level of voice
leading, background or foreground, and for each diminutional level,
there is a corresponding dynamic level of the first order, second order,
and so forth.' '26 In Free Composition, Schenker claimed that
orchestral colors are "subject to the laws of the whole, "27 that "all
rhythm in music comes from counterpoint and only from
counterpoint,' '28 and that all forms' 'receive their coherence only from
the fundamental structure.' '29 These claims, which are never securely
demonstrated, can only be seen as a desperate effort to fulfill the
destiny of the Ursatz as generator not only of "the structure" (Le.,
harmony and counterpoint), but of all recognizable features of a
composition. Had Schenker truly entertained a Constructive Conflict
paradigm, he would never have so completely lost sight of elementary
logic as to convince himself that "pitch structure can have a strong
impact on rhythm/dynamics/orchestration/form" necessarily entails
"rhythm/dynamics/orchestration/form are entirely governed by pitch
structure and by nothing else," a fallacy that has seen manifold
regenerations in the work of recent scholars.
I have tried to show so far why we should be careful about
asserting that Schenker was sympathetic to a Constructive Conflict
paradigm in his later writings. 30 Now I would like to suggest why
this point has more than parochial significance. Beach, Rothgeb, and
26Heinrich Schenker, "The Largo of J.S. Bach's Sonata No.3 for Unaccompanied
Violin [BWV 1005]," trans. John Rothgeb in Felix Salzer (ed.), The Music Forum 4
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 156-57.
27Free Composition, 7-8.
28Ibid., 15.
29Ibid., 16.
30Certain fleeting references in his Harmony suggest that Schenker held a
Constructive Conflict paradigm in his earlier writings, prior to his Ursatz epiphany
(trans. Oswald Jonas, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973). See, for example, his discussion
of fugue subjects in minor (50) or the motivic origins of the Phrygian II chord (110).
Such conflicts are still present in Vol. 1 of Counterpoint. See Carl Schachter,
"Schenker's Counterpoint," The Musical Times 129 (1988): 525.
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Schachter, to the extent that they have endorsed a Constructive
Conflict paradigm, or at least acknowledged its acceptability in
principle, have been mute on the question of whether or not they
consider this paradigm to be the one ultimately held by Schenker. This
muteness is particularly striking in light of the fact that these same
leading scholars have been identified with Schenkerian theory for many
years, not only in their analytic work, but also in their encomiums to
Schenker, their impassioned defenses of his theory under attack, and in
some cases their resistance to proposals for selective modification of
that theory. One would expect that any distancing from Schenker in as
vital a matter as its theoretical underpinnings would be accompanied by
open acknowledgements (if not scrupulous justifications), and would
provoke healthy debate with (if not vigorous dissent from) other
members of the Schenkerian community. It seems reasonable to
induce, from the absence of any such signs, that Beach, Rothgeb,
Schachter, et al., find that constructive conflicts are worthy of
consideration not only because they are interesting, insightful, or
productive, but also because they fall properly from Schenker's own
work. Yet I have shown reason to doubt such a proposition.
Although the history of Schenkerian theory in America has yet to
be written, William Rothstein has noted some ways that the forces of
American academic culture, circa 1985, have come to shape ideas
originally conceived in Vienna, circa 1925.31 Although a convincing
account of the attempt to retrofit Schenkerian theory to a Constructive
Conflict paradigm can only be undertaken in the context of a more
comprehensive study, it is worth making some preliminary
observations. Two themes of Rothstein's study, pragmatism and
eclecticism, are particularly relevant here. A consequence of American
pragmatism is a less idealized, more empirically based outlook, an
orientation toward achieving results. Responses by tonal theorists to
quotidian analytic problems have undoubtedly contributed to the
cultivation of an increased flexibility of approach. In the case of
conservative Schenkerian theorists, this flexibility led to a tension
between theory and practice that stirred polemical rumblings in the
31Rothstein, "Americanization."
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1950s.32 In the case of the neo-Schenkerians, this flexibility led to a
detachment from certain Schenkerian ideals to which they had no a
priori commitment.
Eclecticism, the tendency for diverse, perhaps incompatible
traditions to freely mingle in the intellectual marketplace, led the neo-
Schenkerians to unite Schenkerian theory with a meta-theory borrowed
from systems science. Although this marriage was difficult for
conservative Schenkerians to accept, it may have affected them tacitly
nonetheless. (Consider, for example, the infiltration of the concept of
hierarchy into the discourse of conservative Schenkerians.)33 More
recently, Schenkerians have been exposed to the work of non-
Schenkerian scholars, such as Meyer, Berry, Narmour, Epstein, and
Lerdahl & Jackendoff, which (to generalize much too coarsely) share
a recognition of the complex reciprocal influence of multiple non-
reducible parameters.34 To the extent that Schenkerians have reacted
to this work, their response has, for the most part, not been
sympathetic; nonetheless, I am suggesting that this work has had an
impact on the development of Schenkerian theory in recent years.
The citation of Narmour in this context will strike some as
particularly ironic, in light of the Schenkerian rejection of his work as
a "thoroughly negative contribution.' '35 To say that Schenkerians
32See Jonas's Introduction to Schenker's Harmony, viii (note 2); Ernst Oster, "Re.:
A New Concept of Tonality (?)" Journal ofMusic Theory 4 (1960): 85-98.
33See Milton Babbitt, Review of Structural Hearing, by Felix Salzer, Journal ofthe
American Musicological Society 5 (1952): 262-63; Oswald Jonas, Introduction to
Schenker, Harmony, xx-xxi; Allen Forte, Contemporary Tone-Structures (New York:
Teacher's College of Columbia University, 1955).
34Leonard B. Meyer, Explaining Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973); Wallace Berry, Structural Functions ofMusic (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1976); Eugene Narmour, Beyond Schenkerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1977); David Epstein, Beyond Orpheus (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979; Oxford University
Press, 1987); Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).
35David Beach, "On Analysis, Beethoven, and Extravagance: A Response to Charles
J. Smith," Music Theory Spectrum 9 (1988): 174.
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have in part appropriated Narmour's metatheory is not to say that they
have accepted the shape of Narmour's theory of tonal music, which
(perhaps it goes without saying) reflects a fundamentally different
vision. The irony is that Schenkerians have attacked not only
Narmour's theory, but also those metatheoretical premises which I am
suggesting that they have come to share with him.
To illustrate this point, consider a passage from Beethoven's
Wind Quintet (Example 1), for which Narmour provides two readings.
In Schenkerian terms, the first reading, at (a), treats the D-flat at m. 3
as a lower neighbor which immediately resolves to the E-flat at m. 4.
The second reading, at (b), considers D-flat as part of a linear
progression continuing to C at measure 5, and treats the E-flat at m. 4
as a subordinate escape tone. Narmour argues "not only that the two
'readings' ... are possible or that two different hearings are equally
plausible, but rather that both the axial and the descending linear
structures are heard simultaneously. "36 In essence, he is claiming
that, in one sense, the E-flat in m. 4 is structurally subordinate to the
D-flat in m. 3, but in another sense, the D-flat is subordinate to the E-
flat.
The analysis at (a) is vulnerable on the specifically music-
theoretic grounds that it pays insufficient attention to the tendency of
the unstable fourth degree to resolve downward, or to the parallelism
between the two-measure segments. But Rothgeb chooses to attack it
on a more fundamental level:
One of the more curious of Narmour's ideas is his belief
that two or more mutually contradictory (that is, strictly
speaking, incompatible) interpretations of a musical event
may all be correct and of equal validity.... The question of
whether (a) or (b) in [Example 1] is correct is a music
theoretic question, but the question of whether or not both
(a) and (b) are correct is no more a music theoretic
question than is the question, implicitly contained in it, of
whether the note d-flat2 in bar 3 both goes to and does not
36Narmour, 23.
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go to' the c2 in bar 5 [at this point we are referred to a
footnote:] . . .. the ' 'axial' , and the linear interpretations
cannot be reconciled. 37
[
Example 1. From Narmour, Beyond Schenkerism, 23. Beethoven,
Quintet, Gp. 4, Trio II, mm. 1-15.
(a) triadic
~(b) r f (s)
linear
9 II 13 tr 15
~Wb~ ~~g~~~~
~• (_-)__(_S'_-Jr
Yet Narmour's "curious" view is exactly the one that underlies many
of David Beach's analyses. For example, Beach's two different graphs
of a passage from the slow movement of Mozart's Sonata, K. 545
(Example 2) replicate the situation of Example 1, but in inversion.
Beach writes as follows:
37John Rothgeb, Review of Beyond Schenkerism, Theory and Practice 3/2 (1978): 31.
See also Rothgeb's review of Helmut Federhofer, Akkord und StimnifUhrung, Music
Theory Spectrum 4 (1982): 134.
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It is possible and perfectly reasonable to view the first
four bars of this phrase at two different levels, first as a
closed unit and secondly in relation to the remainder of the
phrase.... We hear the E2 of bar 19 not just as a neighbor
note returning to D2 in the next bar, but also, on a higher
level, as a passing tone connecting the D of bar 17 to the
F# in bar 21.38
15
Example 2. From Beach, "Motive and Structure," 230.
b ®
------------
G: g
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D:13 "
, ~ ~ ~ -1'}4 5
J-------I I J 5th~J IIlll j-----.J -:L
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Essentially, Beach is claiming that E both goes to and does not go
to F-sharp, and that the second D is both structurally superior to and
inferior to the preceding E. To justify this position, he cites an
analogous passage from Mozart's Fantasy in D Minor. But this appeal
merely reminds us that Narmour has already exposed an identical
38Beach, "Motive and Structure," 230-231.
2   3   4and ,
3  ,  the  second  of 
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motivically motivated ~~ to @p, with ~ acting as a passing tone
from ~.
In all cases that fit the four-event scheme, whether posited by
Rothgeb, Beach, Narmour, or Schenker himself,44 the balance
between growth and unity, between energy and stability, is ruptured.
The extra-hierarchical entity, whether its significance is motivic,
rhythmic, or "formal," signals the failure of unity: the whole is "torn
asunder. " To the extent that analysts wish to recognize the
significance of these entities, they must come to terms not only with
conflict, but with contradiction. And indeed, as Cook has suggested
openly, and others more tacitly, the contradiction may indeed be "the
central point round which the analysis revolves." If so, then the great
challenge for music analysis is to find a way to chart the processes of
contradiction between plural autonomous entities in individual
compositions, and the great challenge for music theory is to map the
terrain on which the plural unities engage one another. How many
dimensions will this map have? What are the mechanisms by which
contradictions are resolved, absorbed, perpetuated, transformed, and
how are we, as inner listeners, outer listeners, and performers, to live
these processes? What I have suggested in this paper is that we are not
likely to find answers to questions of this type, or even specific
exemplars upon which general answers might be based, in the late work
of Heinrich Schenker.
The extent to which tonal theorists are now explicitly or implicitly
engaged by questions of this type is exactly the extent to which
Schenkerian theory has given way to post-Schenkerian theory. The
twentieth century has witnessed the critiquing, transcending, and
absorption of the ideas of all of its most brilliant thinkers, from
44Por examples where Schenker violates his own Satzprobe, see Edward Laufer,
review of Free Composition, Music Theory Spectrum 3 (1981): 164-84; Schenker, "The
Largo," 153 (note 20); Allan Keiler, "Some Properties of Schenker's Pitch
Derivations," Music Perception 1 (1984): 211-215; Beach, "A Recurring Pattern," 21,
29 (note 8).
Cohn, Schenker's Theory, Schenkerian Theory 19
Saussure to Chomsky to Freud. Is there any reason why music theory
and Heinrich Schenker should be different? I submit that tonal theory
cannot proceed in good health if it continues to be executed under the
watchful eye of Schenker's ghost.
One of Schenker's most graphic images for the all-generative
power of the Ursatz was the Mutterschof3-the maternal womb.45 The
scope of this metaphor may be broader than Schenker intended.
Although living creatures have unitary origins in maternal wombs, they
grow into independent agents, and enter into relations independent of
those origins. So too, it seems, for musical events issued from the
MutterschoB of the Ursatz. And, to swap metaphier and metaphrand
in Schenker's sociology of tones: so, too, for music theory as a
discipline. Even if we think of Schenker as the unitary center from
which we all grew, are we forever bound to that center? Must the
impulses of growth away from that center be forever reigned in? It
seems not: the moment when the unitary bonds of the Ursatz are torn
asunder is exactly the moment when the unitary bonds of Schenker's
vision lose their monolithic power as well. Catapulted outward by
powerful loins, perhaps we look anxiously back, searching for the cord
that ties us to that origin. We may feel that the cord is actually there,
ready to reel us in. But this perception may be a product of naught but
our nostalgic desires.
45Schenker, Meisterwerk II, 41.
